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1. Does the term "natural mother" in the California Uniform 
Parentage Act denote the woman whose egg provides the genetic 
material for the creation of a child?
2. In order to comport with the constitutions of CaTifornia 
and the United States, must the term "natural mother" in the 
California Uniform Parentage Act denote the woman whose egg 
provides the genetic material for the creation of a child?
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mark C. et al., )
)
Defendants and Respondents. )
)
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
This is an action to determine the parental rights of a child 
created pursuant to a surrogacy arrangement. Respondents Mark and 
Crispina C. and Petitioner Anna J. brought separate actions in the 
trial court to establish parental rights. These actions were 
consolidated for judicial economy. (C.T. 8.)
Orange County Superior Court Judge Richard N. Parslow, Jr., 
sitting without a jury, found Mark and Crispina C. to be the 
biological, genetic, and therefore natural parents of the child, 
thus entitling them to full parental rights under California law. 
(C.T. 608.) The court entered judgment pursuant to these findings 
on November 21, 1990. (C.T. 609.) Judge Parslow further
terminated Anna's visitation rights. (C.T. 609.)
On October 8, 1991, the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
affirmed the trial court's judgment. Anna J. v. Mark C^, 234 Cal. 
App. 3d 1557 (1991). The validity of the trial court's judgment
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is a question of law requiring de novo review by this court. See 
Cal. Teachers Ass^n v. San Dieao Community College Dist.. 28 Cal. 
2d 692, 699 (1981).
— Statement of Facts _
Mark and Crispina C., married in 1982, unsuccessfully 
attempted to conceive a child throughout the first two years of 
their marriage. (R.T. 1200.) Crispina was forced to have a 
hysterectomy in 1984 because of tumors and other complications 
with her uterus. {R.T. 1200.) Though she was left unable to bear 
a child, Crispina retained the capacity to produce eggs. (R.T. 
791.) In 1989, wishing to raise a child created by their own 
genes, Mark and Crispina considered utilizing a surrogate mother, 
who would be implanted by Crispina's egg that had already been 
fertilized by Mark's sperm. (R.T. 1201.)
Anna J., a nurse employed at the same hospital as Crispina, 
approached Crispina in October 1989 after learning from a co­
worker about Mark and Crispina's difficulties. (R.T. 783-84.)
Anna offered to be a surrogate on the couple's behalf. (R.T.
784.) Anna and the C.'s met soon thereafter and discussed at 
length details of the potential arrangement. (R.T. 1203.) During 
that meeting, Anna represented to Mark and Crispina that she had 
been accepted as a surrogate by the Center for Surrogate 
Parenting. (R.T. 1203.) Mark understood this to mean that she 
had been through extensive psychological counseling, medical 
exams, and other screening to ensure her suitability as a 
surrogate. (R.T. 1202.)
On January 15, 1990, Mark, Crispina, and Anna each signed a 
contract entitled "Contract: IVF/Embryo Transfer" (referring to
A
2
in vitro fertilization). (C.T. 11.) This contract called for 
Anna to be implanted with an embryo created by in vitro 
fertilization of an egg from Crispina and sperm from Mark. (C.T. 
14.) Anna agreed to carry and bear this child after the — 
implantation, and to relinquish all parental rights to the child. 
(C.T. 14-16.) The contract stated that Mark and Crispina were 
"morally, biologically, ethically, and contractually" the natural 
parents of the baby. (C.T. 12.) As such, the terms provided that 
after birth the child would be taken into Mark and Crispina's home 
"as their child." (C.T. 14.) In return, Mark and Crispina agreed 
to pay Anna $10,000, in installments ending six weeks after the 
birth, and to take out a $200,000 life insurance policy on Anna's 
life. (C.T. 23.)
On January 19, 1990, doctors implanted the embryo created 
from Mark and Crispina into Anna. (R.T. 791.) On February 10th, 
doctors confirmed with an ultrasound that Anna was pregnant.
(R.T. 797.) Anna obtained a Polaroid photograph of the 
ultrasound, on which she wrote, "Cris's baby 2-10-90," and posted 
the Polaroid in the nurses' station at the hospital where Anna and 
Crispina both worked. (R.T. 798.)
After the pregnancy was confirmed, relations soured between 
Anna and the C.'s. At this time, Mark and Crispina first learned 
that Anna had misrepresented certain crucial facts to them.
Although Anna had previously stated otherwise, she was never 
accepted by the Center for Surrogate Parenting. (R.T. 1353.)
Anna also represented to Mark and Crispina that she had had only 
one previous pregnancy, which resulted in her daughter Erica.
(R.T. 786; R.T. 1204.) However, Anna failed to disclose that she
had had four other pregnancies, two of which resulted in 
miscarriages, the other two in stillbirths. (R.T. 786.)
On July 23, 1990, Anna wrote Mark and Crispina a letter in 
which-she demanded that the remaining payments be advanced 
immediately, before the agreed due dates. (C.T. 33-35.) Anna 
stated that if Mark and Crispina did not comply with her demands, 
then they might "not get the baby," and they would hear from her 
lawyers. (C.T. 35.) Even so, Anna's letter referred to the baby 
as "the child of someone else" (as opposed to herself) and stated, 
"[0]nce this baby is born, my hands are free of this deal." (C.T. 
34-35.) Mark and Crispina had twice previously accommodated Anna 
by making early payments of both the first and second trimester 
amounts (R.T. 829), despite Anna's false statements to the media 
that payments had been late. (R.T. 817.) Anna did not respond to 
Mark's subsequent attempts to contact her regarding the letter. 
(R.T. 1238.) After learning that Anna intended to pursue 
litigation to keep the baby (R.T. 1238-39), Mark and Crispina 
filed this suit on August 15, 1990. (C.T. 1.)
From the time of Anna's initial contact with Mark and 
Crispina in October 1989 until she filed suit, Anna never 
expressed to Mark and Crispina any -desire to pursue parental 
rights to. the baby, particularly because she was not genetically 
related. (R.T. 1205-06',) Anna often referred to herself as "an 
incubator." (R.T. 1204.) Catherine Gewertz, a reporter for the 
Los Angeles Times, interviewed Anna in August 1990. (R.T. 1004.)
During this interview, Anna expressed that she felt no bonding to 
the baby since it was not made from her genetic material. (R.T. 
1006.) Ms. Gewertz quoted Anna in her newspaper article as
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saying, "If it had been my egg it would have made a real big 
difference. But with I.V.F. [in vitro fertilization] there is no 
connection to me. There has been detachment from the baby from 
day on^" (R.T. 1007-08.) _
Sara Duran, Anna's roommate from April to September 1990, 
also testified that Anna had told her repeatedly that the C.'s 
were the baby's parents, that Anna never had any intentions to 
)<eep the child, and that she entered into the agreement because 
she needed money to pay a welfare debt. (R.T. 1311-12.) Anna 
told Ms. Duran in April 1990 that she owed the welfare department 
$10,000. (R.T. 1342.) Anna had been contacted by an Orange
County Welfare Fraud Investigator a few days prior to her letter 
to Mark and Crispina on July 23, 1990. (R.T. 806.)
According to Ms. Duran, Anna consistently expressed 
satisfaction with Mark and Crispina, and with the surrogacy 
arrangement up until the time she decided to file suit. (R.T. 
1313.) Anna first considered litigation after writing the July 
23rd letter because Mark and Crispina, in Anna's words, "won't do 
what I said." (R.T. 1318.) However, Anna did not intend to keep 
the baby for herself; rather, she stated she would put the baby up 
for adoption in the event she won the lawsuit. (R.T. 1319.)
Anna-and her lawyers sought publicity from the media, 
eventually gaining an appearance on the "Phil Donahue" television 
show. (R.T. 1129.) She acquired sufficient funds from this 
appearance to discharge a court judgment in favor of the Orange 
County Welfare Department. (R.T. 830-31.)
Ms. Duran stated she disapproved of the manner in which Anna 
treated her daughter Erica. Ms. Duran and Anna had recurring
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disputes regarding Anna's housekeeping and personal habits, and 
her use of profanity. (R.T. 1344.) In addition, Ms. Duran noted 
that Anna usually fed Erica fast food, doughnuts, or gummy bears 
for dinher. (R.T. 1337-36.) ~
pr. Justin Call, a psychiatrist and pediatrician with 
extensive experience researching genetic variables in infants, 
testified that one's genetic makeup determines how the individual 
will respond to various stimuli in one's environment, including 
while in the uterus. (R.T. 914.) Dr. Call stated that one's 
genetic identity -- a need to know who one's "real" parents are 
and where one came from -- is a very important and integral part 
of the human individual. (R.T. 918.)
According to Dr. Call, no scientific evidence exists to 
support that a fetus attaches emotionally to the individual 
carrying it. Conversely, however, substantial evidence indicates 
that a mother carrying a fetus' often forms an emotional 
attachment, especially when the mother has planned to have the 
child and has invested herself psychologically in that planning. 
(R.T. 919-20.) Some mothers never form any emotional attachment, 
even after birth. This seriously impairs the child's development. 
(R.T. 920.) The mother/baby emotional attachment essentially 
forms post partum. (R.T. 922-24.) In fact, the baby forms such 
an attachment with whomever the primary caretaker may be -- 
mother, father, sibling, or nanny. (R.T. 925.) Dr. Call stated 
it is very important that children be given consistent patterns of 
parenting, especially when they are very young (R.T. 927) , and 
that it would be very damaging to call the infant by two different 
names (except for an obvious nickname). (R.T. 930-31.) Anna
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wishes to call the baby Matthew, while Mark and Crispina have 
named him Christopher. (R.T. 930-31.)
Dr. Call gave his professional opinion that the strongest 
connections to the baby lie with the genetic parents (R.~T. 932), 
despite his acknowledgement that the surrogate mother provided 
nourishment, growth, and protection for the baby. (R.T. 964.)
Dr. Call believed that Anna's July 23rd letter to Mark and 
Crispina indicated a readiness to give up the child; there was no 
indication of any bonding between Anna and the child. (R.T. 980.) 
Moreover, in reference to Anna's remarks to Ms. Gewertz of the Los 
Angeles Times, Dr. Call stated that a mother who would make such a 
statement so close to the baby's birth would be a high risk mother 
for an imperfect attachment and would have poor potential for 
motherhood. (R.T. 987-89.) Asked to give his expert opinion as 
to who should be awarded custody of the baby. Dr. Call stated,
"The child should reside with the genetic parents." (R.T. 942.)
The parties stipulated to blood test results establishing 
Mark and Crispina as the genetic parents. (C.T. 577.). The child 
has resided with Mark and Crispina since his birth on September 
19, 1990. (R.T. 1419.)
ARGUMENT
I. THE TERM "NATURAL MOTHER" IN THE CALIFORNIA UNIFORM PARENTAGE 
ACT DENOTES THE WOMAN WHOSE EGG PROVIDES THE GENETIC MATERIAL 
FOR THE CREATION OF A CHILD.
A. The California Uniform Parentage Act's language is most
reasonably interpreted to designate the "natural mother"
a s the woman whose eoa provides the baby's oenes.
This court must determine who is the legal mother of the baby 
in this case of first impression. The answer lies in the 
California Uniform Parentage Act ("U.P.A."), Civil Code sections
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7000-7021^ in which the legislature defined most of the 
potential issues regarding parent-child relationships. It 
neglected, however, to specifically distinguish between a genetic 
mother and a birth mother. That is, the code makes no explicit 
reference to surrogacy arrangements. Yet, its language focusing 
on the parent/child relationship, paternity disputes, and the role 
of blood tests implies that -the woman whose egg provides a baby's 
genes is the "natural mother." Consequently, Crispina C. is the 
legal mother, and the judgment should be affirmed.
1. The Uniform Parentage Act's language indicates that 
a woman lacking any genetic link to a child cannot 
be the child's natural mother; thus, a genetic 
connection is integral to a mother/child 
relationship.
The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to 
ascertain the legislative intent. People v. Aston. 39 Cal. 3d 
481, 489 (1985). To determine this intent, the first step is to 
look to the statute's words themselves. People v. Woodhead. 43 
Cal. 3d 1002, 1007 (1987). If the statutory language is clear and 
unambiguous the plain meaning of the statute must be followed.
Cal. Teachers Ass'n, 28 Cal. 3d at 698. However, when statutory 
language is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation, courts may look to the statutory scheme, and other 
extrinsic aids, Woodhead. 43 Cal. 3d at 1008.
In defining a legal parent, the U.P.A. repeatedly refers to 
the "natural parent." That is, the code plainly defines "parent- 
child relationship" as "the legal relationship existing between a 
child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to which the
' All statutory references are to the Civil Code unless 
otherwise stated.
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law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and 
obligations." Cal. Civ. Code § 7001 (West 1983) (emphasis added) 
Thus, the legal mother is also the "natural mother."
The legislature, however, stopped short of providing a" 
precise definition of a natural mother. To find the legislative 
intent as to the code section setting forth criteria for creation 
of parent and child relationship, a court may look to the entire 
Uniform Parentage Act and not merely at the section to be 
interpreted.- Griffith v. Gibson, 73 Cal. App. 3d 465 (1977).
The U.P.A. as a whole considers the possibility that a woman 
who gives birth is not necessarily the natural mother. Section 
7003 provides: "The parent and child relationship may be 
established . . . between a child and the natural mother ... by 
proof of her having given birth to the child, or under this part. 
Cal. Civ. Code § 7003 (West 1983) (emphasis added). A natural 
mother and a woman who gives birth are two separate identities 
under the language of section 7003, although they are typically 
the same person. The U.P.A. strongly implies that there are 
distinct criteria for defining a "natural mother," which do not 
necessarily include giving birth. The U.P.A. merely indicates 
that birth is one way to establish the relationship, apparently 
leaving open the possibility that the natural mother could be 
someone other than the woman who bore the child.
Anna, in arguing that birth necessarily establishes 
motherhood under section 7003, also fails to recognize that a 
woman giving birth to a child lacking her genes was a 
technological impossibility when the legislature enacted the 
U.P.A. in 1975. California's lack of legislative history for the
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code supports this proposition. In 1975 the procedure of 
implanting an embryo formed from one woman's egg into a different 
woman was still merely a futuristic concept in the minds of 
scientists. The legislature did not -- and could not envision 
any circumstances in which the woman who gave birth to a child did 
not also provide the child's genes. Yet, as is often the case, 
the legislature anticipated that unexpectedly unique factual 
situations might arise. They therefore inadvertently provided for 
this contingency by creating an additional clause under section 
7003 ("or under this part") under which courts can determine that 
a woman other than the birth mother is the natural mother. This 
language suggests that the genetic tie, and not the physical act 
of giving birth, is the critical factor in identifying the natural 
mother.
The rapid advancement of technology further supports a 
statutory construction favoring the genetic mother. Scientific 
progress continues to surprise us all. Since doctors can now 
routinely create an embryo in a laboratory with a man's sperm 
cells and a woman's ovum (as with Mark and Crispina), it is quite 
conceivable that scientists will someday develop technology to 
serve other biological functions as'well.
Anna.herself referred to her role as that of an incubator.
Her role was to protect’the fetus, provide it with nourishment and 
fluids for its development, and remove its waste. Someday, after 
more astonishing technological advances, scientists could 
conceivably create mechanical incubators that are able to perform 
all of those critical functions for a fetus's development. The 
machine would contain the fetus' for the nine-month gestational
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period. Then, at just the right time, the doctor would simply 
remove the baby from the incubator, at which time the baby would 
be ■born."
Applying Anna's logic that she is the natural mother solely 
for having given birth would imply that the futuristic mechanical 
incubator in this scenario would be the natural mother! This 
absurd conclusion illustrates the point. The legislature did not 
envision specific advances, but they apparently anticipated that 
at some point birth would not necessarily be determinative of 
motherhood. This case has finally presented the contingency for 
which the legislature provided. Under these facts, and other 
possibilities in the future, the genetic link must logically be 
the critical factor in establishing the natural mother.
The role of blood tests in the U.P.A. further supports 
interpreting the statute to require a genetic link between the 
natural mother and her child. Civil Code section 7004 refers to 
blood tests in the Evidence Code to determine the identity of a 
"natural father" in paternity disputes: "[IJf the court finds that 
the conclusions of all the experts . . . based upon blood tests .
. . are that the [man] is not the father of the child, the 
question of [his] paternity . . . shall be resolved accordingly." 
Cal. Evid. Code § 621 (West Supp. 1992). In other words, a man is
not the naluaral father if blood tests reveal that he has no __
genetic relationship to the child.^
^ The Evidence Code refers to conclusions in the negative, 
rather than the positive, because blood tests are usually more 
conclusive in establishing a lack of paternity. In the instant 
case, however, the parties stipulated that the blood tests 
conclusively determined Mark and Crispina to be the genetic parents 
of the child born by Anna. Thus, under the circumstances it is
civil Code section 7004 and Evidence Code section 621
together suggest that the genetic relationship is the key to 
determining a person's parental rights and obligations, as opposed 
to the~t>irth process. In this case, the parties stipulated to 
blood tests conclusively establishing Mark and Crispina as the 
genetic parents, and confirming Anna's lack of any genetic 
relationship to the baby.
Civil Code section 7015 allows section 7004 to be applied to 
women in maternity disputes, even though it refers only to men and 
paternity. See Cal. Civ. Code § 7015 (West 1983). Specifically, 
section 7015 states that "[a]ny interested party may bring an 
action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and 
child relationship [and] the provisions of this part applicable to 
the father and child relationship apply." Id. Thus, section 7015 
allows section 7004's paternity blood tests to apply to a 
maternity action.^ These blood tests indicate that Crispina is 
the natural mother,
2. A comparison of the original Uniform Parentage Act 
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners 
on State Laws and the California Civil Code 
indicates the California Legislature intended the 
genetic mother to be the natural mother.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws ("Commissioners") drafted the original Uniform Parentage Act 
in 1973. Unif. Parentage Act §§ 1-29, 9A U.L.A. 587 (1979). 
Shortly thereafter, several states, including California in 1975,
appropriate to apply the code in the positive when referring to 
Mark and Crispina's blood tests.
^ See discussion under subheading 2, below for further 
analysis of section 7015's impact in resolving maternity disputes.
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enacted their own versions of the U.P.A. modeled after the 
Commissioners' draft. The Commissioners' Comments to the U.P.A. 
reveal an intent to resolve maternity disputes in the same manner 
as^aternity questions. That is, a blood test is determinative in 
establishing the identity of a natural mother, as well as a 
natural father.
As discussed above, California's U.P.A. provides that "[tjhe 
parent and child relationship may be established . . . [bjetween a 
child and the natural mother by proof of her having given birth to 
the child, or under this part." Cal. Civ. Code § 7003 (West 1983) 
(emphasis added). The Commissioners' draft is virtually 
identical.Thus, as discussed under the previous subheading, 
the Commissioners -- and California's Legislature -- intended for 
courts to loo]^ to the various other sections of the U.P.A. when 
the identity of the natural mother is in question.
Section 21 of the Commissioners' U.P.A., which corresponds to 
section 7015 of the California version, specifically directs 
courts' attention to the U.P.A. paternity sections for. resolving 
maternity contests. That section provides, "Any interested party 
may bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of 
a mother and child relationship. Insofar as practicable, the 
provisions of this Act [part] applicable to the father and child 
relationship apply." Unif. Parentage Act § 21, 9A U.L.A. 612
* The only notable difference between the California Civil 
Code and the U.P.A. is that the Code reads "or under this part," 
whereas the U.P.A. reads "or under this Act." The word "part" 
apparently refers to the "part" or portion of the Civil Code that 
encompasses the entire codified version of the Commissioners' 
Uniform Parentage Act. It certainly does not refer to section 7003 
exclusively, for there are various uses of the phrase "under this 
section" elsewhere in the Civil Code to make such a reference.
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(1979) (Cal. Civ. Code variation in brackets). The corresponding
Corranissioners' Comment gives insight into this dual application:
This Section permits the declaration of the mother and
__child relationship where that is in dispute. Sin_ce it
is not believed that cases of this nature will arise 
frequently. Sections 4 to 20 [equivalent to sections 
7004 to 7014 of the Civil Code] are written principally 
in terms of the ascertainment of paternity. While it is 
obvious that certain provisions in these Sections would 
not apply in an action to establish the mother and child 
relationship, the Committee decided not to burden these 
-- already complex -- provisions with references to the 
ascertainment of maternity.
Unif. Parentage Act § 21, 9A U.L.A. 613 (1979) (Commissioners' 
Comment to section 21) (emphasis in original).
The Commissioners, therefore, specifically intended that the 
entire Uniform Parentage Act should be used to determine who the 
natural mother is, and not just the natural father, unless such a 
dual application is logically unreasonable.^
In the instant case, most significant of these sections 
cross-referenced by the Commissioners is section 7004, which 
provides for a determinative conclusion of paternity through the 
use of blood tests under Evidence Code section 621. The parties 
have stipulated that blood tests conclusively established Mark and 
Crispins as the child's genetic parents. Thus, Crispins C. must 
be the natural mother, not Anna.
Significantly, the California Legislature amended the
^ The Commissioners state that a judge presiding over a 
maternity dispute "should have little difficulty deciding which 
portions [of the U.P.A. referring to paternity] should be applied." 
Unif. Parentage Act § 21, 9A U.L.A, 613 (1979) (Commissioners' 
Comment to section 21) . This implies that only those sections 
which cannot logically fit a maternity context are inapplicable.
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Coinmissioners" heading^ to U.P.A. section 4 when it codified the 
section as Civil Code section 7004.^ The Commissioners entitled 
section 4 "Presumption of Paternity." Unif. Parentage Act § 4, 9A 
590 (1979) . The legislature, on the other han^, entitled 
Civil Code section 7004 "Natural father; rebuttable presumption; 
conditions." Cal. Civ. Code § 7004 (West 1983). The legislature 
apparently thought it necessary to emphasize that section 7004's 
primary function was to establish the identity of the natural 
father in a -paternity dispute- Similarly, the natural mother 
should be the focus of 7004 in a maternity dispute.
The Commissioners' U.P.A, section 5 (corresponding to Civil 
Code section 7005), which addresses artificial insemination, 
provides further evidence of the legislature's intent in defining 
a natural mother. The Commissioners' Comment under that section 
reads as follows: "This Act does not deal with many complex and 
serious legal problems raised by the practice of artificial 
insemination. . . . Further consideration of other legal aspects 
of artificial insemination [e.g., surrogacy] ... is recommended 
to state legislators." Unif. Parentage Act § 5, 9A U.L.A. 593 
(1979) (Commissioners' Comment to section 5). The California 
Legislature ignored the Commissioners' advice and failed to add
^ "Consideration may be given to chapter and section headings 
in codes in interpreting the various sections." People v. Navarr_o, 
7 Cal. 3d 248, 273 (1972).
Civil Code section 7004 is virtually identical to U.P.A. 
section 4, except that section 7004 adds the reference to Evidence 
Code section 621 in establishing paternity by blood tests. The 
U.P.A. contains no such similar reference in section 4. However, 
the U.P.A. provides similar opportunities to prove or disprove 
paternity through blood tests in its sections 11 and 12, which 
sections were both omitted from the California Civil Code.
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any subsections to section 7005 to specifically deal with "other 
legal aspects of artificial insemination," namely surrogacy. The 
legislature evidently found U.P.A. section 5 to be adequate when 
it was codified, believing blood tests would adequately resolve 
the other issues not specifically addressed by the code.
The Commissioners' Uniform Parentage Act, the model for 
California's version in the Civil Code, provides helpful insight 
into our legislature's intent. The Commissioners' Comments, as 
well as comparisons between the U.P.A. and the Civil Code, 
indicate that surrogacy disputes and other questions of maternity 
are to be resolved in the same manner as paternity disputes. 
Therefore, Mark and Crispina's blood tests are determinative in 
establishing them as the natural parents of the child.
B. Public policy requires that the Uniform Parentage Act, be
construed to designate the woman whose egg provides the 
baby's genes as the natural mother.
Extrinsic aids, including public policy, may be used to 
interpret a statute which is not clear from its language. People 
V. Woodhead. 43 Cal. 3d 1002, 1008 (1987). Not only does the 
Civil Code's most reasonable construction favor the genetic mother 
as the natural mother, but this case also presents critical public 
policy considerations to support the contention that Crispina -- 
and generally any genetic mother -- is the natural mother under 
the Civil Code.
1. Public policy necessitates establishing a stable 
legal framework for enforcing surrogacy 
arrangements as they provide a valuable social 
function.
For many years, couples unable to conceive or give birth to a 
child were prevented from having any genetically-related children.
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That left only the alternative of adoption, which can be a slow, 
frustrating, and risky procedure. Only in recent years, through 
the miracle of artificial insemination and surrogacy, have such 
couples been able to start a family with children of aT least 
partial genetic relation. These scientific advances have provided 
countless couples with the joy of a baby to call their own. Many 
surrogacy agreements have been formed and successfully completed 
by women desiring to give the gift of a child to a couple that 
could not otherwise have children. Thus, the value of surrogacy 
speaks for itself.
Unfortunately, surrogacy arrangements are subject to abuse. 
The couple, or more frequently the surrogate, may have a change of 
heart well into the pregnancy. The scenario is familiar: the 
surrogate decides to keep the baby, the couple is heartbroken, and 
the baby ends up the innocent victim of a legal and emotional (and 
often public) battle. Not only do the couple and the child end up 
as losers in the deal, but so does society as a whole.
Overburdened courts are forced to resolve yet more litigation that 
should have been avoided. Worse yet, often the courts themselves 
are unable to find a solution, for they have no legal foundation 
on which to form a sound decision. Therefore, this court must 
fashion a well-defined legal framework to resolve the instant case 
and future surrogacy battles.
Anna J. typifies the unreliable surrogate. Apparently 
motivated solely by financial gain, Anna agreed to help the 
hopeful couple realize their dream of having a child. Anna 
indicated that she fully understood the commitment she had made to 
Mark and Crispina when she volunteered to be their surrogate, and
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she repeatedly expressed to the C.'s and others her lack of desire 
to keep the child, referring to herself as Mark and Crispina's 
"incubator."
Once Anna recognized the intensity of Mark and Crispina's 
emotions for this prospective baby, she manipulated them. Anna 
requested and received from Mark and Crispins early payments for 
both the first and second trimester installments. She later 
demanded the remaining funds from the C.'s more chan two months 
before they were due, lest they "not get the baby.*
When Anna did not get her way, she followed through with her 
threats, initiating this lawsuit. She opportunistically sought 
attention from the media, eventually succeeding in receiving an 
invitation to the "Phil Donahue Show." She gained sufficient 
proceeds from her appearance on the show to pay off a welfare 
fraud judgment owed to the Orange County Welfare Department. Yet, 
Anna told her roommate that she nevertheless had no intention of 
keeping the child; she would put him up for adoption after her 
possible victory in court. Anna J. embodies all the abuses to 
surrogacy that this court must prevent.
The legislature has not specifically addressed the question 
of surrogacy arrangements. That leaves this court with two 
options: (1) abolishing surrogacy entirely, or (2) creating 
security for their enforcement in the form of a solid legal 
framework. To exercise the former option would be tragic, for it 
would deprive many couples of their only practicable method of 
having children. Therefore, it is essential that this court seize 
the opportunity presented here to provide clear guidelines for 
surrogacy arrangements. These public policy considerations compel
18
a result in favor of the "genetic" mother.
2. Public policy indicates that a child"s best
interests are to be parented by his or her genetic 
parents.
This court's decision will affect many future chTldren, 
products of embryo transplants and surrogate parenting. The 
children must face the consequences of the decision. Thus, they 
deserve consideration of their interests. As one court recently 
stated in an adoption matter, "The best interests of this young 
child must be our paramount concern." Adoption of Matthew B., 232 
Cal. App. 3d 1239, 1251 (1991). In the end, this court should 
seek a result which will "maximize [the] child's opportunity to 
develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult." Id. at 1263. Common 
sense supports these statements.
Few would disagree that the essence of parenting is to act in 
the best interests of the child, including making proper decisions 
about such matters as education, health, nutrition, and 
discipline. The key consideration is that a child be raised by 
someone who will give him or her proper care. The ideal person 
for that role is the child's parents themselves. Yet, in this and 
other surrogacy cases, where the identity of the mother is 
disputed, it is critical to consider the child's best interests in 
defining "natural mother." The best interests of this child 
require that he be raised by Mark and Crispina C., the people whom 
he will, closely resemble both physically and genetically.
The Matthew B. court noted certain factors to consider in 
determining a child's best interests: "[A]n assessment of the 
child's age, the extent of bonding . . . and the [parent's] 
ability ... to provide adequate and proper care and guidance to
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the child." Adoption of Matthew B.. 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1263.
The court further noted that considering a child's best interests 
requires a relative -- not absolute -- analysis. Id. at 1264. 
Therefore, this court should consider the child's best interests 
as an opportunity to be raised by Mark and Crispina C., as opposed 
to the alternative, Anna J.
Christopher (his name given by the C.'s) has lived with Mark 
and Crispina since his birth more than two years ago. Christopher 
has undoubtedly developed a significant and irreversible bond with 
Mark and Crispina during that period. Dr. Justin Call explained 
the importance of a child's emotional bonding with his caretaker 
to facilitate normal development. He stated that consistent 
patterns of parenting are vital. If Christopher were to be 
removed from Mark and Crispina, the impact on Christopher's psyche 
would certainly be devastating. Moreover, a person's genetic 
makeup is an integral aspect of that individual's identity, 
according to Dr. Call. This may explain why adopted children 
often seek out their natural parents. These factors all 
contribute to Dr. Call's opinion concluding that Christopher 
"should reside with the genetic parents."
Mark and Crispina's personal characteristics, as compared to 
Anna's, further indicate that Christopher's best interests are to 
remain with the C.'s. Sara Duran's observations of Anna's 
treatment of Erica indicate an irresponsible mother who sets a 
poor example for her child, specifically by her unhealthy eating 
habits and inappropriate behavior. Anna's deceitful conduct with 
Mark and Crispina indicates a lack of integrity. Her trouble with 
the Orange County Welfare Department is consistent with her
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pattern of dishonesty about her history of pregnancies, her 
contradictory coinnents to the media, and her dubious motives for 
volunteering to be Mark and Crispina's surrogate.
Finally, the evidence does not indicate that Anna^can provide 
Christopher with the care and love he deserves. Anna told Ms. 
Duran that she would want to put the child up for adoption if she 
won parental rights. Moreover, until she filed suit, Anna 
repeatedly expressed a lack of interest in keeping the baby, at 
which time she was apparently motivated to use the baby as a 
bargaining tool, and as punishment to Mark and Crispina for not 
complying with her demands. Her apparent lack of genuine interest 
in the child prompted Dr. Call to express his professional concern 
for the child's well-being under her care, labelling Anna as a 
poor candidate for motherhood. All these factors indicate that 
granting Anna parental rights by denoting her as the natural 
mother would be detrimental to Christopher.
In the end, we must recognize that this case, as well as the 
Uniform Parentage Act as a whole, is ultimately about children.
We can reasonably presume that the legislature's overall 
consideration in formulating these laws is to provide a scheme 
that will best serve children, to let them develop into happy and 
productive members of our society. In this case, and in surrogacy 
arrangements in general, such a policy requires that the U.P.A. 
denote the natural mother as the woman whose egg provides the 
child's genes.
II. THE TERM "NATURAL MOTHER- IN THE CALIFORNIA UNIFORM PARENTAGE 
ACT MUST DENOTE THE WOMAN WHOSE EGG PROVIDES THE GENETIC 
MATERIAL FOR THE CREATION OF A CHILD IN ORDER TO COMPORT WITH 
DUE PROCESS.
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A. Because Mark and Crispina^s constitutionally recognized
liberty interest in being able to procreate 
substantially outweighs any rights Anna may possess as a 
gestational mother, they must be the natural parents of 
the child under the right of due process in the_ynited
States and California Constitutions. ~
Mark and Crispina have a fundamental liberty interest in 
being able to procreate. Anna does not have such a fundamental 
interest in parenting the implanted embryo of Mark and Crispina. 
The state may not deny parental rights to Mark and Crispina in 
this case; to do so would deprive them of their fundamental rights 
in violation of the right of due process under the U.S. and 
California Constitutions. U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1; CAL.
CONST, art. 1, § 13.
1. California has recognized that Mark and Crispina 
possess a fundamental liberty interest in being 
able to procreate.
Mark and Crispina possess a fundamental liberty interest in 
procreation which stems from their guaranteed right of privacy.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that an 
individual's freedom from abridgement of liberty without due 
process of law encompasses an interest in freedom of privacy. 
Griswold V. Conn.. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). This -fundamental liberty 
interest- in privacy extends to the right to procreate -- to 
decide whether or not to bear children. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973). California recognized this extension of fundamental 
privacy rights to procreation four years before Roe in People v., 
Belous 71 Cal. 2d 954 (1969). The people of California eliminated 
any doubt as to the propriety of extending -implied" privacy 
rights to individuals, when they added the express right of 
privacy to article I, section 1 of the state Constitution in 1972.
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The California Supreme Court has interpreted this express privacy- 
right to be a broader right than the implied federal one. City of 
Santa Barbara v. Adamson. 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130 (1980) (noting that 
the federal right is "narrower than what the voters approved . . . 
when they added 'privacy' to the California Constitution.").
Since the California right is broader, it necessarily encompasses 
the federal right; California guarantees every privacy right 
guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution.
Mark and Crispina possess a fundamental interest in being 
able to procreate because they are protected as citizens of the 
United States and California by the constitution of each. See 
Roe, 410 U.S. at 113; Belous. 71 Cal. 2d at 954. Mark and 
Crispina's liberty interest in procreating is at least as strong 
as the announced federal right because of California's broader 
privacy right. See Adamson. 27 Cal. 3d at 130.
2. Anna has no fundamental liberty interest in
parenting this implanted embryo because she lacks a 
genetic link to it.
The right of privacy does not protect Anna in this case 
because she seeks to have new constitutional rights created -- a 
fundamental interest in parenting the implanted embryo of another 
couple. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed its 
hesitance to create new rights "not readily identifiable in the 
Constitution's text." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 
(1986) (holding that privacy interest does not extend to engaging 
in homosexual sodomy). Justice White has noted that courts should 
be "extremely reluctant to breathe still further substantive 
content into the Due Process Clause so as to strike down 
legislation adopted by a State ... to promote its welfare."
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Moore V, City of E. Cleveland. 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977)
(dissenting opinion). Indeed, the "interest denominated as a 
liberty" must be one that is "traditionally protected by our 
society." Michael H. v. Gerald D.. 491 U.S. 110, 122 T1988).
^ examination of the history of the interest which Anna 
proposes reveals that it has not been traditionally protected. 
Privacy rights are implied by the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Griswold. 381 U.S. at 479. To be 
traditionally protected an interest logically must "predate" those 
amendments. Such interest must have been fundamental when those 
amendments were written; it must have had protection in our 
society at that time.® Activities which did not exist when the 
amendments were adopted cannot logically be "traditionally 
protected by our society." See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122.
Some activities that, unlike parenting an implanted embryo, 
have been traditionally practiced in our society have nevertheless 
been found not to be traditionally protected. For example, though 
homosexual sodomy has been practiced throughout the history of our 
country, the U.S. Supreme Court has held its practice to be an 
interest not traditionally protected by our society. Bowers. 478 
U.S. at 191. Similarly, unwed fathers have long treated-their 
offspring as their children, but the courts have been unwilling to 
extend parental rights to them. See Michael H., 491 U.S. 110;
® It can be argued that the California right of privacy, 
expressly adopted in 1972, necessarily encompasses all rights 
"traditionally protected" in and before that year. If correct, 
however, this analysis would have no effect here. Interests 
protected before adoption of the Bill of Rights would remain 
protected. Yet embryo transplantation did not exist in 1972; it 
would remain unprotected under this analysis.
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Lehr V.—Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1943) (denying unwed father's 
right of notice of child's adoption proceedings), Though these 
activities did exist before the adoption of the Bill of_Rights, 
they are still not seen as traditionally protected practices.
In the case at bar, Anna seeks to extend a liberty interest 
to a practice -- parenting another couple's implanted embryo -- 
which came into existence only in the past few years.’ Such a 
new practice cannot be a fundamental liberty interest encompassed 
in the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment; it was not only 
unprotected, but did not exist throughout our history. Therefore, 
Anna has no fundamental liberty interest in parenting the 
implanted embryo of Mark and Crispins.
3. Whatever rights Anna may possess from carrying the 
child are subordinate to Mark and Crispins's 
fundamental liberty interest in being able to 
procreate; due process therefore requires that 
their parental rights be upheld.
Mark and Crispins's liberty interest in being able to 
procreate mandates that their parental rights be upheld here. 
Defining natural mother in the U.P.A. as the woman who gives birth 
would violate substantive due process by abridging Mark and 
Crispins's fundamental interest in procreation without a 
compelling state interest. Further, Respondents' fundamental 
rights substantially outweigh any rights that Petitioner may 
possess in this case. Finally, Anna waived any rights to this 
child by entering into the surrogacy agreement.
Again, the "pre-1972" California analysis would have no 
effect here if adopted.
a. The 'natural mother" cannot be defined as the 
woman who gives birth without unduly abridging 
Mark and Crispina's fundamental interest in 
procreation in violation of the due process 
clause.
“Th order to comport with substantive due process, the U.F.A. 
must define the Respondents as the natural parents. Interpreting 
natural mother to denote the woman who gives birth would abridge, 
indeed completely eliminate, Crispina's right to procreate. 
Crispina's tumors and resulting hysterectoiry have left in vitro 
fertilization as her only means of exercising her fundamental 
right to procreate. Defining natural mother as birth mother for 
the purposes of the U.P.A. would cut off Crispina's means to 
exercise her fundamental right to procreate.
Substantive due process dictates that the state can abridge 
Crispina's fundamental liberty interest only if the state shows 
that its action furthers a compelling state interest, which it has 
failed to do in this case. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479; Weber 
v. City Council of Thousand Oaks. 9 Cal. 3d 950 (1973). State 
abridgement of rights which are not deemed to be fundamental is 
subject to a less stringent standard. In such a case the state 
action is upheld unless it is found to be arbitrary or 
unreasonable. Weber. 9 Cal. 3d at 958-959. In applying this 
standard a court considers all the circumstances, including policy 
considerations, surrounding the state action to determine whether 
such action is .rationally related to furthering the state's 
purpose. Id.
Because Crispina's interest in parenting her child is 
fundamental. denying protection of this right (through 
interpreting the statute to define natural mother as birth mother)
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can only be justified if it advances a compelling state interest. 
^ Griswold 381 U.S. at 479; Weber. 9 Cal. 3d at 959. ’ However, 
neither a compelling state interest nor its advancement-has been 
demonstrated here. Further, adopting Anna's suggested 
interpretation would in this case directly hinder the state 
interest of preserving contract rights by effectively voiding the 
agreement of the parties. Because no state interest is advanced 
by the suggested statutory definition, no justification exists 
here for abridging Crispina's fundamental right to procreate.
Even if Crispina's right is deemed to be less than 
fundamental, the interpretation suggested by Anna is unreasonable 
because couples who cannot create their own child need these 
arrangements. Policy ramifications demonstrate such 
unreasonableness; in fact, policy supports upholding the 
interpretation of natural mother as genetic mother. Adopting 
Anna's interpretation would leave any woman who is unable to bear 
a child absolutely unable to raise a child created from her egg 
and her husband's sperm. Such a decision would encourage 
surrogates to break their contractual arrangements with donating 
couples, effectively eliminating any assurances of the fulfillment 
of the arrangement. Such a tenuous option in exercising one's 
constitutional rights is effectively no option at all. Further, 
surrogates such as Petitioner choose to be implanted; in fact,
Anna volunteered in this case. The record indicates that Anna has 
tormented the Respondents psychologically because she had a change 
of heart. It is unreasonable for the state to invalidate Mark and 
Crispina's rights to support the rights of a surrogate who 
capriciously changed her mind.
Finally, the resolution of this dispute has a broad effect 
upon the needs of society, which requires a continued definition 
of the natural mother as the genetic mother. One California 
court, in interpreting the U.P.A., has recommended 'deferring to 
the legislature in matters involving complex social and policy 
ramifications far beyond the facts of the case." Nancv S. v. 
Michele G.. 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 841 (1991) (denying parental 
rights to lesbian companion of genetic and birth mother after 
separation). California must continue to interpret the U.P.A. as 
applying to genetic mothers; if natural mother is to mean anything 
different the legislature must make that change. Id.
The state cannot define the natural mother as birth mother 
without abridging Mark and Crispina's fundamental interest in 
parenting their child. Because there is no compelling state 
interest advanced by such a definition, and such a definition 
would be unreasonable, application of this interpretation would 
violate substantive due process of law.
b. Anna's right to procreate is not abridged here 
because she can still choose whether to bear a 
child; therefore Mark and Crispina's 
fundamental right to procreate substantially 
outweighs any rights Anna may possess in this 
case, and must be preferred in order to 
comport with due process of law.
Mark and Crispina's fundamental right to procreate must be 
preferred to any inferior rights which Anna may possess in this 
case because their interests substantially outweigh hers. Anna 
does possess a general liberty interest in procreating. See Roe, 
410 U.S. at 113; Belous. 71 Cal. 2d at 954. However, a decision 
in favor of Mark and Crispina here does not prohibit Anna, or 
surrogates generally, from exercising that right in the future.
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Anna also claims that both she and her daughter have become 
attached to the new child, which gives her parental rights. 
However, attachment is not a sole basis for parental rights. 
Applying such reasoning, babysitters and child care specialists 
would also be able to claim such rights. Finally, Anna 
■YQlyPtpggred to place herself in this position; it is illogical for 
her to claim that the U.P.A., which confirms her decision to act 
as surrogate only, grants her substantive rights in the 
alternative. Indeed, had Anna wished to fulfill her commitment, 
and had the couple subsequently defaulted on their duties, 
certainly Anna would have invoked the U.P.A. (with a definition of 
natural mother as genetic mother) to support her action to enforce 
the contract.
The correct approach to the conflicting interests in this 
case is to prefer the more fundamental interest possessed by the 
Respondents. The United States Supreme Court has pointed out that 
interests tend to collide when a husband, wife, and third party 
all claim parental rights to the same child{ren) . Michael H.. 491 
U.S. at 130. Granting parental rights to Mark and Crispins must 
necessarily diminish the inferior rights (if any) of Anna. The 
appellate court here, confronted with such a collision of 
interests, correctly noted that "[gjiven that Mark and Crispins 
are the 'natural parents,' due process can hardly be used to 
deprive them of the traditional parental relationship which they 
might otherwise be able to enjoy." Anna J. v. Mark C.. 234 Cal. 
App, 3d 1557, 1575 (1991). Because the rights of Mark and 
Crispins substantially outweigh any rights Anna might be found to 
possess, and because only they or she can have parental rights.
7Q
due process mandates that their parental rights be preferred to 
hers.
__ c. Anna waived any rights, including _
constitutional rights, which this court may 
find her to possess in this case by signing 
and accepting the benefits of the surrogacy 
agreement,
Even if this court finds that a woman lacking a genetic link 
possesses a liberty interest in a child that she bears, Anna 
waived such interest here by entering into the surrogacy agreement 
with Mark and Crispina. The United States Supreme Court has held 
that constitutional rights can be waived in the same manner that 
all rights can be waived. Wall v. Parrot Silver & Copper Co.. 244 
U.S. 407 (1917) ("There is no sanctity in such a claim of 
constitutional right as prevents its being waived as any other 
claim of right may be."). California has followed this rationale, 
finding that acceptance of the benefits conferred by legislation 
constitutes a waiver of the right to challenge that statute on 
constitutional grounds. People v. Hvmes. 161 Cal. App. 2d 668, 
672-673 (1958) . In Hvmes. the defendant voluntarily invoked the 
Sexual Psychopathy Act ("S.P.A."), which allowed for a 
determination of possible psychosis of criminal defendants in sex 
crime prosecutions. Id. at 669-670. The act provided for its 
invocation by the judge, the prosecutor, or the defendant. Id. at 
670. Hymes sought to accept the benefits of observation, care, 
and treatment which the S.P.A. afforded him. Id. at 673.
However, after being committed to an institution as a sexual 
psychopath, Hymes challenged the constitutionality of the 
legislation. Id. The court held that "having invoked the 
beneficent provisions of the law," the defendant could not "be
heard to question the constitutionality" of it. Hymes 161 Cal.
App. 2d at 673.
Because Anna has accepted the benefits of the Uniform 
Parentage Act with a definition of natural mother as genetic 
mother, under Hymes she cannot now challenge this application of 
the act. The U.P.A., so defined, allows women to be surrogate 
mothers of the another couple's genetic child. Without the 
protection of parental rights which this definition provides, 
there would be no market for surrogate mothers such as Anna. The 
parties signed their contract under the auspices of the U.P.A., 
which allowed for their contractual relationship. Anna 
contractually agreed to carry the embryo of Mark and Crispina to 
term and to relinquish all parental rights to the child. In 
return, Mark and Crispina agreed to pay Anna $10,000 in 
installments for her services, and to take out a $200,000 
insurance policy on her life. Anna accepted both installment 
payments and the insurance policy -- she accepted the benefits due 
her under the contract for which the act (only with natural mother 
defined as genetic mother) provided. After accepting these 
benefits, Anna "cannot be heard to question the constitutionality" 
of the Uniform Parentage Act. Hvmes. 161 Cal. App. 2d at 673.
Anna waived her right to claim that the statute is 
unconstitutionally defined because she accepted the benefits of 
that definition when she contracted with the Respondents.
®• Refining Mark and Crispina as the natural parents of
their child comports with the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Constitution because this definition is rationally
related to a legitimate state purpose, and the
alternative definition is a suspect classification and
does not advance a compelling state interest.
A definition of the genetic mother as the natural mother, and 
the surrogate mother as not the natural mother, is a rational 
distinction advancing a legitimate state purpose, and thus 
granting parental rights to the Respondents does not violate equal 
protection. However, the opposite interpretation would define 
Mark as the natural father, but not Crispina as the natural 
mother. This discrimination based upon gender is inherently 
suspect, yet does not advance a compelling state interest, and 
therefore violates the equal protection clause.
1. Defining the genetic, and not the surrogate, mother 
as the natural mother is rational and thus does not 
violate the equal protection clause.
Defining Crispina as the natural mother under the U.P.A. 
comports with equal protection because it creates rational 
classifications for her and Anna which are related to legitimate 
purposes. The Supreme Court has declared that classifications of 
individuals for the purpose of different applications of 
legislation are subject to a two-tiered test of constitutionality. 
See Bernal v. Fainter. 467 U.S. 216 (1984); Plvler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202 (1982); McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm^rs. 394 U.S. 802 
(1969). California has also applied this test. See Weber v. City 
Council of Thousand Oaks. 9 Cal. 3d 950 (1973). If the case does 
not involve "suspect classifications," the challenged statute is 
constitutional if it "bears a rational relationship to a 
legitimate state purpose." Id. at 958-959. If, however, the 
statute does involve suspect classifications, the classification 
must be strictly scrutinized -- it is upheld only if it is 
"necessary for the furtherance of a compelling state interest."
-Id. at 959. 'Suspect classifications include primarily those based
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on race and gender. Korematsu v. U.S.. 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(holding race to be a suspect classification); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding gender to be a suspect 
classification),
Defining Crispina, and not Anna, as the natural mother is not 
a suspect classification; it is based not upon race or gender, but 
upon differing contributions to the creation of a child.
Therefore, this definition is constitutional if it is rational to 
advance a legitimate state purpose.
The U.P.A., with the genetic mother definition, is a highly 
rational means of effectuating state purposes because it upholds 
fundamental liberty interests. As discussed, Mark and Crispina 
have a fundamental liberty interest in being able to procreate.
It is undisputed that the state has a legitimate purpose in 
upholding fundamental liberties. The genetic mother definition of 
natural mother furthers this state purpose by making it possible. 
In fact, the classification between genetic mothers and surrogates 
who bear implanted embryos not only bears a rational relationship 
to the aforementioned state purpose, it effectuates it by making 
it possible. The state also has a legitimate purpose of 
preserving contract rights. The classification here is rationally 
related to achieving that end. Defining the genetic, and not the 
surrogate, mother as the natural mother for the purposes of the 
Uniform Parentage Act is rationally related to a state purpose and 
thus comports with the equal protection clause.
2. The Equal Protection Clause would be violated by 
defining the woman who gives birth as the natural 
mother because this would discriminate on the basis 
of gender by leaving Mark as the natural father, 
while Crispina would not be the natural mother.
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Application of the definition suggested by Anna would violate 
equal protection by discriminating between the Respondents on the 
basis of gender. Anna urges that the court define the woman who 
gives birth, and not the genetic mother, as the "natural mother." 
Such a definition would classify Crispina as not the natural 
mother. However, under the act Mark would still be classified as 
the natural father. Mark and Crispina have taken equal actions in 
this case; they have each contributed their respective body 
material, and have jointly given money, time, and support to Anna. 
Mark and Crispina are thus similarly situated, except for their 
gender. Therefore the definition proposed by Anna would 
discriminate between the two of them on the basis of gender. See 
Anna J.. 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1576.
This classification based upon gender is inherently suspect. 
See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 677. Because the classification 
suggested by Anna would thus be suspect, it must be viewed under 
strict scrutiny, and upheld only if it is necessary to further a 
compelling state interest. Weber. 9 Cal. 3d at 959.
The classification which Anna suggests would not further a 
compelling state interest. Again, no such compelling interest has 
been shown. In fact, such a classification would directly hinder 
state purposes. As mentioned, the state has an interest in 
upholding individuals' fundamental liberties. But the suggested 
classification would effectively eliminate the ability of women 
who cannot give birth to children to pursue their fundamental 
interest in bearing a biologically related child, thus posing an 
obstacle to the state interest. Further, such a classification 
hgre would hinder the state purpose of preserving contract rights.
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Therefore, defining Petitioner as the natural mother would violate 
Respondents' rights of equal protection.
CONCLUSION
The California Uniform Parentage Act's language is most 
reasonably interpreted to designate the "natural mother" as the
woman whose egg provides the baby's genes. Public policy
considerations support this interpretation.
In addition, because Mark and Crispina's liberty interest in 
procreating substantially outweighs any rights Anna may possess, 
they must be the natural parents of the child under due process 
rights. Defining Mark and Crispins as the natural parents 
comports with the Equal Protection Clause because this definition 
is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.
For these reasons. Respondents Mark and Crispins C. pray this 
court to affirm the judgment of the Fourth District Court of 
Appeal granting full parental rights under the California Uniform 
Parentage Act.
Respectfully submitted,
35
